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TOWARDS "NEVER AGAIN": SEARCHING FOR A 
RIGHT TO REMEDIAL SECESSION UNDER 
EXTANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Steven R. Fishert 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 16, 2014, the Crimean Status Referendum was held.' The 
referendum asked the people of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 2 if they 
supported political alignment with Russia or a restoration of the 1992 Cri-
mean constitution that granted a greater degree of sovereignty than both 
entities were accustomed to under the then-existing political structure with 
the Ukraine) This referendum notably did not allow the option of maintain-
ing the "status quo" of both Crimea and Sevastopol as being a part of the 
Ukraine. 4 Oddities and irregularities regarding the potential desire to main-
tain the current political situation aside, an overwhelming majority (while 
there is some variance among numerous reports, the conservative consensus 
seems to be over 95%) of both Crimea and Sevastopol voted to join the 
t I would like to thank several people, without whom this Article would not be 
possible. First and foremost, I must thank Mike Hecker and Kevin Espinosa for their 
time and patience with me while I initially grappled with these ideas. I hope they view 
that time as being as productive as I believe it was. Stephanie Forman, Amanda Web-
ber, Brittany Crowley, and Kathryn Krause were tremendously helpful with research 
and were always willing debate on secession and international law generally. Their 
work was instrumental in making this work and the ideas contained within what they 
are. Finally, I must thank the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, specifically my good 
friends Marc Smith and Cara Cox, for helping craft my manuscript into the Article it is 
today. Without your work and efforts, this Article would amount to little more than a 
few disjointed thoughts. 
1. Denver Nicks, Crimea Signs Treaty to Join Russia, TIME (Mar. 18, 2014), http:! 
/time.com/28443/putin-paves-way-for-crimea-annexation; Crimea Referendum: Voters 
'Back Russia Union,' BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-26606097. 
2. Sevastopol is a city located in the Crimean Peninsula on the coast of the Black 
Sea. The city has lengthy ties to Russia and is currently used under lease by the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet. See generally Serhii Plokhy, The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian 
HistoricalMythology, 35 J. CONTEMP. HIsT. 369 (2000) (providing additional informa-
tion on Sevastopol). 
3. Noah Sneider, 2 Choices in Crimea Referendum, but Neither is 'No,' N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/crimea-vote-
does-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html. 
4. Id.; Noah Rayman, UkraineSecession Referendum Does Not Have a 'No' Op-
tion, TIME (Mar. 7, 2012), http://time.com/16318/ukraine-crimea-referendum-russia. 
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Russian Federation.5 Many commentators-including the governments of 
the Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and many other state 
governments-asserted that any referendum held by a local government 
without the permission of the Ukrainian government violated both Ukrain-
ian and international law. 6 Russia and the Crimean Parliament have argued 
to the contrary-claiming that the secession is legal as an exercise of the 
right to self-determination, the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") rul-
ing in its Kosovo advisory opinion, and the precedent of the situation in 
Kosovo and its secession from Serbia generally. 
7 
Two days after the referendum, on March 18, 2013, the Treaty on the 
Adoption of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed, integrating Cri-
mea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. 8 The Russian Federal As-
sembly ratified the treaty on March 21, 2013, acting to fully integrate the 
5. Elisha Fieldstadt, Early Count Shows 95 Percent of Crimea Votes Want to Be 
Russian, NBC News (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-cri-
sis/early-count-shows-95-percent-crimea-voters-want-be-russian-n54096 (asserting that 
95.7% of voters elected to break away from Ukraine and join Russia); Anton Troianov-
ski & Paul Sonne, Ukraine Region Votes to Join Russia, Wall St. J. (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702304914904579441563920333966 (re-
porting over 96% of voters in the referendum voted to join Russia); Official Results: 97 
Percent of Crimea Voters Back Joining Russia, CBS News (Mar. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/official-results-97-of-crimea-voters-back-joining-russia (find-
ing 97% of voters in favor of aligning with Russia). 
6. Official Results: 97 Percent of Crimea Voters Back Joining Russia, CBS News 
(Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-results-97-of-crimea-voters-
back-joining-russia ("The U.S., EU and Ukraine's new government do not recognize 
the referendum held Sunday in Crimea, saying it violates both Ukrainian and interna-
tional norms."); Is Crimea's Referendum Legal?, BBC News (Mar. 13, 2014), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26546133 (indicating that leaders of the G7 all con-
demn the referendum in Crimea as being contrary to international law); Tom Cohn, 
Legal or Not, Crimean Referendum will Shape Ukraine Crisis, CNN (Mar. 15, 2014), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/politics/crimea-referendum-explainer ( xplaining the 
believe that the referendum in Crimea is in violation of both Ukrainian constitutional 
law and established international law). 
7. Cohn, supra note 6 (reporting the Russian argument that the referendum in Cri-
mea is legal as it is similar to Kosovo's secession from Serbia); Crimea Crisis: Russian 
President Putin's Speech Annotated, BBC News (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-26652058 (translating into English Russian President Vladimir Pu-
tin's speech defending Russia's treaty to integrate Crimea and Sevastopol). 
8. Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federa-
tion Signed, PRESIDENT OF RusSIA (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890; 
Crimea Annexation into Russia: Putin Approves Draft Treaty to Absorb Peninsula, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/crimea-
annexation-into-russia-putin-approves-treaty n_4983534.html. 
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two territories into Russia.9 Russian forces swiftly seized control of many of 
Ukraine's military bases in the region, aided by the decision of Ukrainian 
leadership to withdraw Ukrainian forces in the interest of preventing the 
loss of life.' 0 
On the international stage, much was made of the situation in Crimea. 
The United Nations Security Council debated and attempted to pass a reso-
lution condemning the actions, only to have it blocked by Russia, a perma-
nent member of the Security Council with veto power. " All other members 
voted in favor with one state, China, abstaining. 12 The General Assembly, 
however, had more luck in its actions to denounce Russia's actions. Adopt-
ing a resolution titled "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" by a vote of 100 
versus I I (with 58 abstentions) the General Assembly called on states to 
not recognize any change to Ukrainian territory.' 3 The resolution asserted 
the Assembly's determination that the Crimean referendum "has no valid-
ity" and that all involved parties must work together to pursue a peaceful 
resolution as quickly as possible. 14 At the time of this writing, the situation 
remains largely unresolved and the status of Crimea and Sevastopol will 
vary from source to source. 
In light of the recent events in Crimea, secession has been thrust to the 
center of the public consciousness. Particular attention has been given to the 
legality of secession, not just in relation to Crimea, but also generally, under 
international law. Everyone from scholars to world leaders offered their in-
terpretation of the legal status of the Crimean referendum, with the views 
expressed often being as varied as those offering them. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin indicated his belief that the situation in Crimea is legally 
9. Russian Federation Council Ratifies Treaty on Crimea's Entry to Russia, THE 
RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY TASS, (Mar. 21, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/724749. 
10. Marie-Louise Gumuchian & Victoria Butenko, Ukraine Orders Crimea Troop 
Withdrawal as Russia Seizes Naval Base, CNN (Mar. 25, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2014/03/24/world/europe/ukraine-crisis. 
1I. UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, UN NEWS SERV. 
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=47362#.VOIDUPnF-
_S. 
12. Id. 
13. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize 
Changes in Status of Crimea Region, UNITED NATIONS: MEETINGS COVERAGE & PRESS 
RELEASES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal 1493.doc.htm. 
14. Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Refer-
endum Invalid, UN NEWS SERV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsLD=47443#.VOIDIvnF-_s. 
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acceptable following precedent set by Kosovo's secession from Serbia.' 5 
President Putin declared: 
Our western partners created the Kosovo precedent with their own 
hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they 
recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing 
that no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral 
declaration of independence is necessary.' 
6 
President Putin argued as well that the ICJ affirmed that same assertion 
as law with respect to the situation in Kosovo. 17 Conversely, much of the 
international community, including both United States President Barack 
Obama 18 and United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron, have con-
demned the action as violating both Ukrainian domestic law as well as in-
ternational law.' 9 
The controversy over secession does not, however, end with its spe-
cific and recent application to the situation in Crimea. While this incident 
did certainly draw new attention to the issue, the issue itself is not new. 
15. Patrick Goodenough, Crimea Vote: Putin Cites Kosovo 'Precedent,' CNS 
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/crimea-
vote-putin-cites-kosovo-precedent; Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims 
Crimeafor Russia andBitterly Denounces the West, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), http:/ 
/www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html. 
16. Putin: Crimea Similarto Kosovo, West is Rewriting its own Rulebook, Russ. 
TODAY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rt.com/news/putin-address-pariament-crimea-562; see 
also Crimea Crisis: Russian PresidentPutin's Speech Annotated, supra note 7. 
17. Putin: Crimea Similar to Kosovo, West is Rewriting its own Rulebook, supra 
note 16. A more detailed discussion and analysis of the ICJ's determination in its case 
concerning the Kosovo situation can be found later in this article. See infra text accom-
panying footnotes 244-56. 
18. Coral E. Lee & Jay Solomon, Obama Warns of Sanctions Over Crimea Con-
flict, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230 
4554004579422861484329156, (quoting President Obama as claiming Russia's actions 
constitute illegal intervention under international law); Ukraine crisis: 'Illegal' Cri-
mean referendum condemned, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-europe-26475508 (quoting President Obama as stating a referendum in Crimea 
would: "violate the Ukrainian constitution and international law"). 
19. Crimea Vote on Russia Illegal, Says Cameron, THE TIMES (Mar. I1, 2104), 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4028884.ece; Nicholas Win-
ning, Planned Crimean Referendum Illegal, Cameron Says, WALL ST. J. ( Mar. 10, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0001424052702304020t045794313608863 
55696 ("A planned referendum in Crimea to decide whether the region will secede from 
Ukraine and become part of Russia would be illegal, illegitimate and wouldn't be rec-
ognized by the international community, British Prime Minister David Cameron said 
Monday."). 
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Though secession was once the most common means by which states came 
into existence, 20 it is now regarded with little short of unrelenting skepti-
cism in most cases.2 ' During the decolonization era, peoples commonly se-
ceded and created new states, often accompanied by revolutions and wars of 
independence. 22 Despite the prevalence of secession at this time, the law 
remained unclear. As the Aaland Island situation indicates, there seemed to 
be little clarity over who could secede and when secession could be permis-
sible.2 3 Even in the United Nations ("UN") era, the law on secession has 
been anything but clear. The UN's judicial arm, the ICJ has struggled with 
the issue, at least tangentially, numerous times.
24 
It is difficult to imagine a topic in international law-save perhaps 
humanitarian intervention-so fraught with dispute as secession. Some as-
sert that unilateral secession is entirely prohibited as it would violate the 
well-established principle of territorial integrity, while others argue it is 
completely permissible in some cases as a means by which people may 
exercise their human right to self-determination. The reality to this di-
lemma, as with most controversies, lies somewhere in the middle. 25 Seces-
sion may easily be understood as one of international laws' most 
20. JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 
(2007) [hereinafter THE CREATION OF STATES]. 
21. Id. at 415 ("State practice since 1945 shows the extreme reluctance of States to 
recognize of accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context.") 
22. See id. at 375-76, 388. 
23. This is plainly apparent when comparing the perceived legal secessions of 
numerous states effecting decolonization with the situation of the Aalanders. Compare 
infra text accompanying notes 39-48 (giving examples of wars for independence lead-
ing to secession), with infra text accompanying notes 83-140 (discussing the report of 
the League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs concerning the Aaland Islands and 
the decision that the Aalanders lacked the legal ability to secede). 
24. This article will specifically address the ICJ's decisions pertaining to Kosovo, 
East Timor, Western Sahara, Namibia, and the Palestinian Wall. All of these decisions, 
while not specifically addressing secession, deal with a related issue such as territorial 
integrity or the self-determination of people. Accordingly, they are instructive on the 
current legal status of secession under international law. 
25. Former UN Secretary-General U Thant offers one of the most articulate ex-
pressions of this conflict in his Introduction to the Report of the Secretary General in 
1971. Secretary-General Thant opined: "[a] ... problem which often confronts us, and 
to which as yet no acceptable answer has been found in the provisions of the [UN] 
Charter, is the conflict between the principles of the integrity of sovereign States and 
the assertion of the right to self-determination, and even secession, by a large group 
within a sovereign State. Here again . . . a dangerous deadlock can paralyse the ability 
of the United Nations to help those involved." U.N. Secretary-General, Introductionto 
the Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, 148, U.N. Doc. 
A/8401/Add.1 (Sept. 1971). 
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controversial gray areas.26 Indeed, noted scholar and current Judge of the 
ICJ James Crawford has indicated that secession is neither legal nor 
27
illegal. 
Despite this, there have been numerous historical examples of when 
secession has been accepted, either explicitly or implicitly, including sev-
eral from the modern UN era.28 The common theme to most, if not all, 
accepted modem secessions is that the seceding group is or has been sub-
jected to widespread subjugation and exploitation at the hands of the origi-
nal state.29 To use just a few examples: the Albanians in Kosovo were 
subject to massive human rights violations by the Serbian government, 30 the 
largely Christian population of South Sudan was subjugated by the mostly 
Muslim majority in the Sudan,31 and Russia has defended accusations that it 
illegally intervened in Crimea by claiming that ethnic Russians living in the 
region were being mistreated by the Ukrainian govemment. 32 Secession for 
this purpose, correcting human rights violations, has been termed remedial 
secession-that is, secession accomplished in an attempt to remediate an 
ongoing situation-and will be the specific focus of this Article. 
26. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 
(8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE'S]. 
27. Id. 
28. Examples include the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and the secession of 
South Sudan from the Sudan, both of which will be discussed in greater detail later in 
this article. Arguably, even Crimea's secession from the Ukraine-while legally dubi-
ous for a variety of reasons-may provide further evidence as, at the time of the writing 
of this article, it has not been re-integrated into the Ukraine despite severe condemna-
tion for the secession and annexation from all corners of the international community. 
29. Compare the situations in Kosovo (secession occurred with Kosovo now 
widely recognized as an independent state following a genocide perpetuated by the 
Serbian government), and South Sudan (now a recognized independent country where a 
southern Afro-Christian population was oppressed by the northern Arab-Muslim popu-
lation while a part of Sudan), with Crimea (secession has been largely condemned and 
few states recognize Crimea as a legitimate part of Russian territory where there were 
no reports of large-scale, wide-spread, and/or systemic discrimination against ethnic 
Russians by the Ukrainian government). 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 262-74 (discussing the Kosovo opinion and 
situation generally). 
31. See generally JAMES COPNALL, A POISONOUs THORN IN OUR HEARTS: SUDAN 
AND SOUTH SUDAN'S BITTER AND INCOMPLETE DIVORCE (2014) (detailing the human 
rights situation in South Sudan and the causes, motives, and actions concerning South 
Sudan's eventual secession from Sudan). 
32. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
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I. GOALS 
In the wake of the ICJ's Kosovo advisory opinion much was written in 
the academic community about remedial secession. While many scholars 
have discussed what this comment will term remedial secession-with 
some going as far as to argue that perhaps such a right to secession should 
exist-few, if any, asserted that it did exist.33 This comment seeks to ac-
complish that. Since Kosovo, the international landscape has changed im-
measurably. State practice has become more favorable to a right to remedial 
secession in certain, limited circumstances. Viewed in totality, current inter-
national law may support a cognizable right to remedial secession. 
This comment will assert that there does currently exist a right to re-
medial secession under extant international law. In doing so, it will review 
the history of secession and the jus cogens right to self-determination 34 that 
is frequently asserted as providing the legal basis for secession. It will argue 
that two of the most commonly posited justifications for secession-seces-
sion to cure egregious human rights violations (what is often termed-and 
what this comment will call-remedial secession) and secession as an ex-
pression of external self-determination where a people are unable to effect 
meaningful internal self-determination-are, de facto, the same. Finally, 
this comment will briefly attempt to synthesize the extant law of self-deter-
mination and secession and attempt to create a unified rule for when, if 
ever, remedial secession is permissible under international law. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK 
To understand the current state of secession it is necessary to examine 
the historical background of the concept. Prior to World War I, secession 
was likely the most common means of creating a new state.35 Secession at 
this time was widely thought of as involving the threat or use of force 
against a sovereign in an effort to gain political independence from that 
33. See, e.g., Joshua Castellino, TerritorialIntegrity and the "Right" to Self-De-
termination:An Examinationof the ConceptualTools, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 503, 565-
68 (2008); Thomas W. Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, 
from Katangato Kosovo, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105, 172-73 (2011); Jure Vidmar, 
InternationalLegal Responses to Kosovo's Declarationof Independence, 42 VA. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 849-51 (2009). 
34. Ajus cogens right (also known as a peremptory norm) is one from which no 
derogation is legally permitted. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 594. The right of a peo-
ple to self-determination is accepted as ajus cogens right. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmen-
tation of Int'l Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification & Expansion of Int'l 
Law, [ 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006). 
35. THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 375. 
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sovereign; what historians would generally term a war of independence or 
revolutionary war.36 This pre-World War I period saw numerous secession-
ist movements, many accompanied by violence and done with the aim of 
overthrowing colonial rule.
37 
The most notable example is likely the American Revolutionary War, 
where thirteen of Great Britain's North American colonies fought an almost 
eight-year war for independence. 38 Similarly, in Central and South America 
numerous wars of independence resulted in the secession of Brazil from 
Portugal in 1822. 39 Not to be outdone by its Iberian rival, Spain lost numer-
ous wars resulting in the secession of colonies during this period. Ecua-
dor-then part of Gran Columbia-gained its independence in 1822,40 the 
last Spanish troops surrendered to Chile in 182641 (though some argue that 
Chile effectively seceded in 1821),42 and Peru seceded from the Spanish 
Empire in 1824,43 to name just a few.44 Mexico achieved its independence 
from Spain, after over a decade of fighting, in 1821. 45 Not only limited to 
the Americas, this was a global trend, with Greece effecting its secession 
from the Ottoman Empire in 183246 and Belgium seceding from the Nether-
lands in 1831.47 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See generally JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE IN-
VENTION OF AMERICA (2010); LELAND G. STAUBER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A 
GRAND MISTAKE (2010) (discussing the history of the American Revolution). 
39. See generally GABRIEL PAQUETTE, IMPERIAL PORTUGAL IN THE AGE OF AT-
LANTIC REVOLUTION: THE LUsO-BRAZILIAN WORLD, C. 1770-1850 (2013) (providing a 
detailed analysis on the history, causes, and legacy of the independence of Brazil). 
40. See DAVID W. SCHODT, ECUADOR: AN ANDEAN ENIGMA 26-29 (1978). 
41. See also SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE: 1808-
2002 (2004). See generally SIMON COLLIER, IDEAS AND POLITICS OF CHILEAN INDEPEN-
DENCE 1808-1833 (1967). 
42. The 1921 date comes from the expulsion of the Royalist forces from what 
would become mainland Chile. See, generally, COLLIER, supra note 41 (discussing the 
Chilean independence movement and its associated dates). 
43. See TIMOTHY E. ANNA, THE FALL OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN PERU 220-
38 (1979). 
44. For further information and discussion on the history of the decolonization of 
Central and South America see CONNECTIONS AFTER COLONIALISM: EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA IN THE 1820s (Matthew Brown & Gabriel Paquette eds., 2013). 
45. See THOMAS BENJAMIN, LA REVOLUCION: MEXICO'S GREAT REVOLUTION AS 
MEMORY, MYTH, AND HISTORY 101 (2000). 
46. C.M. WOODHOUSE, THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS HISTORICAL SET-
TING 148-49 (discussing international recognition of an independent Greece in 1832). 
47. DANIEL H. THOMAS, THE GUARANTEE OF BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-
TRALITY IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY, 1830's-1930's 21 (1983). 
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After World War II, a new period of secessions began. Similar to the 
pre-World War I secessions, they were accomplished by groups of people 
seeking independence from colonial rule. 48 Unlike the earlier secessions, 
however, these were generally accomplished with the consent of the former 
colonizing power.49 The UN Charter declared that among the purposes of 
the UN was "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. '50 This 
nod to self-determination ushered in a period of voluntary decolonization 
where most states endeavored to grant independence to their former colo-
nies.5' Despite the willingness to support secession in an effort to effect 
decolonization, outside of that context the international community has 
been reluctant to accept unilateral secession.5 2 Indeed, since the end of 
World War II, no state created by unilateral secession has gained UN recog-
nition over the objections of the predecessor state.53 When permissible uni-
lateral secession is referenced outside of decolonization, it is done in one of 
two ways. 54 First, as remedial secession to cure human rights violations. 
55 
Or, in the alternative, to provide the seceding people with a means to exer-
cise their right to self-determination where they are being denied the means 
to exercise the same right within their current state.5 6 In addressing the issue 
head-on, the ICJ elected to not determine whether or not remedial secession 
itself is inherently legal or illegal, thus leaving the issue open for further 
interpretation and, perhaps, litigation. 
57 
III. SECESSION AS AN EXPRESSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
The conclusion of World War II ushered in a new era of international 
relations. The formation of the UN and the Cold War combined to create 
the modern framework for international law. Views on secession shifted, as 
the prevailing thought was that the state was the smallest unit in the interna-
tional system. That is to say, a UN member state was indivisible in the 
48. THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 375. 
49. Id. 
50. U.N. Charter art. 1, 2. 
51. THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 375. 
52. Id. at 390. 
53. Id. 
54. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 138 (Can.) 
[hereinafter Quebec]; BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 142. 
55. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 133. 
56. Id. para. 134. 
57. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, paras. 82-83 
(July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo]; BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 142. 
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international system. As such, it followed that any movements or attempts 
to partition such a state would be met with resistance. Doing so could upset 
the delicate balance of peace that was established following World War II. 
Gone were the times when secession was the most common method of state 
creation, as the international community attempted to settle its borders. De-
spite this fact, discussion of secessions continued. 
The most prevalent lens through which secession is discussed in mod-
ern international law is as an expression of a people's right to self-determi-
nation. 58 A people's right to self-determination is generally understood to 
be exercised internally, that is, via the democratic mechanisms within the 
people's state.59 However, because of the irreproachable nature of the right 
to self-determination there are circumstances where, lacking any effective 
means of exercising internal self-determination, a people may be entitled to 
use external self-determination to attain their rights. 60 This external expres-
sion of self-determination would cleave the state, preventing the people 
from exercising their rights, resulting in a new state where self-determina-
tion rights would be used internally. 61 
A. Pre-UNEra 
Discussion of a right to self-determination can be found dating back to 
the beginnings of modem international law and the writings of Hugo Gro-
tiUs. 62 In his work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), 
Grotius gives an early discussion on man's inherent right to self-determina-
tion.63 Grotius begins by defining a "right" as it pertains to individuals. 64 
For Grotius a right in this sense is a "moral quality annexed to the person, 
justly entitling him to possess some particular privilege." 65 The "moral 
quality" referred to in the aforementioned quote is, when effected perfectly, 
' a "faculty. 66 Grotius then concludes his discussion by writing: "Civilians 
58. See THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 384-88. 
59. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 131. 
60. See id. para. 134, see also Aaland Islands Report, infra note 82, at 4-5. 
61. See Quebec, supra note 54, 134; see alsoAaland Islands Report, infra note 
82, at 4. 
62. Hugo Grotius was a Dutch lawyer and scholar widely considered to be the 
father of modem international aw. For further discussion on Grotius, his works, and his 
importance to the field of international law see, e.g., CHRISTIAN GELLINEK, HUGO GRO-
TIUS (1983); GROTIus READER, (L.E. van Holk & C.G. Roelofsen eds., 1983). 
63. See HUGO GROT1US, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 7-9 (A.C. Campbell 
trans. 2001). 
64. Id. at 8. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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call a faculty that Right, which every man has to his own; but we shall 
hereafter, taking it in its strict and proper sense, call it a right. This right 
comprehends the power, that we have over ourselves, which is called 
liberty. '
67 
Grotius's conception of this "liberty" due to every man is the founda-
tion of the right modern international law recognizes as self-determination. 
By defining liberty as power over oneself Grotius argues man has the right 
to determine his own path personally and also politically. 68 This liberty is a 
faculty when expressed perfectly and-whether perfect or imperfect-is a 
moral quality and thus a right.69 As rights justly entitle those who possess 
them to a privilege, all men are justly entitled to the power over themselves 
to determine their political future. 70 This power is what modern interna-
tional law calls self-determination. 
While Grotius's work provides the framework for much of modern 
international law, progress has obviously been made. Particular strides were 
made following World War I. The creation of the League of Nations sym-
bolized a new era in international law. For the first time, sovereign states 
banded together to create a permanent (or so it was thought to be) interna-
tional body which would serve some form of global governing function. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations, its founding document, is instruc-
tive on this shift. Notably, there is no discussion on the rights of the individ-
ual.71 Indeed, the only time non-state actors are referenced throughout the 
Covenant is in Article 22, where colonization is discussed and encouraged 
in order to provide for the "well-being and development of such peoples" 
who are "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions 
of the modern world."'72 While this Article notes that some groups, such as 
those formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, may be ready to be recog-
nized as independent nations, others are not deemed to be as advanced.
73 
Specific reference is made to the people of Central and South-West Africa 
along with those inhabiting many South Pacific Islands, as being yet unable 
to, for some reason or another, fend for themselves in the modern world. 
74 
In sum, the right of a people to self-determination has yet to emerge to the 




70. See id. at 7-8. 
71. See League of Nations Covenant. 
72. Id. art. 22, para. 1. 
73. Id. art. 22, para. 4. 
74. Id. art. 22, paras. 5, 6. 
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In this sense, the Covenant can be seen as a retreat from Grotius' aca-
demic idealism. Firmly grounded in realism, the Covenant made no attempt 
to place all states and, indeed, all people on a like footing.75 Keenly aware 
of the human costs of World War I, the writers of the Covenant appear to 
have been much more concerned with preserving the peace. Indeed, the first 
line of the preamble indicates the purpose of the League of Nations was to 
"promote the international co-operation and to achieve international peace 
and security. ' 76 Specifically, it goes on to list the "obligation[I] not to resort 
to war" that all members would commit themselves to.77 Article Sixteen 
reinforces this purpose, declaring that any Member of the League making 
war on another Member in violation of the Covenant will be assumed to 
have declared war on the entirety of the League. 78 Even more, Members are 
bound to supply military might to wage war against the offending nation. 79 
Clearly the Covenant was written with a single-minded purpose: the pre-
vention of future conflicts between established states. 
The only discussion in the Covenant pertaining to secession, even tan-
gentially, is the Article Ten mandate that the member States must "respect 
and preserve" the "territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League." 80 As will become apparent, references to the 
importance of territorial integrity rarely bode well for secessionist move-
ments.81 This Article can be seen as the dawning of a pattern of conflict 
between a people's right to self-determination and a State's right to territo-
rial integrity. 
While the Covenant of the League of Nations is not in and of itself 
tremendously instructive on self-determination, the League of Nations era 
as a whole is not so underwhelming for this task. In 1920, the League cre-
ated a Commission of Rapporteurs to lend itself to a solution for what had 
75. See id. 
76. Id. pmbl. 
77. Id. art. 12. 
78. Id. art. 16, para. 1. 
79. Id. art. 16, para. 2. 
80. Id. art. 10. It is worth noting the dichotomy between the League of Nations 
reference to territorial integrity and the UN expression of the same norm. The League's 
Covenant indicates that territorial integrity it is to be preserved for all Member States, 
whereas the UN Charter indicates it is a right due to all States, irrespective of member-
ship status. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
81. See infra text accompanying footnotes 83-139 (discussing the conflict between 
territorial integrity and secession in the context of the Aaland Islands situation). 
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become known as the Aaland Crisis. 82 The memorandum put forth by the 
Commission outlined the then-existing state of international law with re-
spect to secession and, more largely, self-determination. 
83 
The Aaland Crisis itself can be traced back to the 1860s and the com-
plex relationship between Russia and Finland. 84 Since that time Finland, 
then a somewhat autonomous part of Russia, had regular governmental 
meetings.85 This situation began to change in the 1890s when Russia en-
gaged in a widespread policy of "Russification." 86 To effect this policy, 
Russia issued the February Manifesto of 1899, placing the legislative mech-
anisms of Finland under the control of a new Governor-General.8 7 This con-
tinued until the Russian Revolution in 1917.88 Seizing the opportunity, 
Finland declared itself independent in December 1917.89 Likely having 
more pressing matters to contend with, 90 Vladimir Lenin recognized an in-
dependent Finland. 9' 
Shortly after attaining its independence, Finland entered a period of 
civil war.92 This conflict would prove to be the direct cause of the Aaland 
Crisis. Many Aalanders were concerned for the future of Finland given the 
civil war and uncertain relationship with Russia. 93 Indeed, the very same 
82. See generally JAMES BARROS, THE ALAND ISLANDS QUESTION: ITS SETrLE-
MENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 300-05 (elaborating on the creation of the Commis-
sion-termed by Barros the "Commission of Inquiry"-and its composition). 
83. See Report Presentedto the Councilof the League of Nationsby the Comm. of 
Rapporteurs,League of Nations Doc. B7 21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands 
Report]. 
84. Sia Spiliopoulou Aakermark, The Aaland Islands Questions in the League of 
Nations: The Ideal Minority Case? 13 Y.B. POL. THOUGHT, CONCEPTUAL HIST. & FEMI-
NIST THEORY 195, 198 (2009). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. "Russification" involves an increased emphasis on ethnic Russian culture 
in an attempt to culturally homogenize the Russian state. For further discussion and 
information see TUOMO POLVINEN, IMPERIAL BORDERLAND: BOBRIKOV AND THE AT-
TEMPTED RUSSIFICATION OF FINLAND, 1898-1904 18-22, (Steven Huxley trans.). 
87. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 198. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Just a few months before Lenin had overseen the execution of the ruling Ro-
manov family in an effort to consolidate his power. GREG KING & PENNY WILSON, THE 
FATE OF THE RoMANovs 282-95 (2003) (discussing Lenin's involvement in the killing 
of the Romanovs). For further discussion of the Russian Revolution generally and its 
impact on Russia's foreign policy see COMPETING VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLU-
TION (Michael C. Hickey ed. 2011). 
91. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 198. 
92. Id. 
93. See id. at 199. 
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month Finland declared independence, the Aalanders began to petition the 
Swedish government to reunify the Aaland Islands with Sweden. 94 Over 
half of the voting population of the Aaland Islands would sign this peti-
tion. 95 Core to this desire for reunification were the similarities between the 
Aalanders and Swedes in origin, language, and history. 96 A delegation from 
the Aaland Islands expressed those thoughts saying "[t]he Aalanders's char-
acter and mentality are of a Swedish nature. 
'97 
Seeking to turn this rhetoric to action, the Aalanders established and 
elected an unofficial governing body, the landsting, to work towards 
reunification with Sweden. 98 The Aalander's arguments focused on the yet-
to-be clearly established idea of self-determination.99 This notion was fur-
thered by post-World War I assertions of then-United States President 
Woodrow Wilson.l°0 To further the notion that the Aalander's were seeking 
self-determination, they enacted numerous parliamentary procedures and 
mechanisms within the landsting,all aimed at framing the issue as one of 
popular representation.'l0 The Commission itself was impressed by these 
steps, especially the complete lack of violence employed by the Aalanders 
in their quest to secede. 02 The Commission specifically found the Aa-
landers to be "[p]eaceable and law-abiding, [having] only employed the 
means most calculated to gain the sympathies of civilised nations in order 
0 3 
to win their case."' 
1 
It is also necessary to note that a relevant third-party, Sweden, could 
hardly be termed as disinterested in the situation. Sweden asserted two in-
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. at 199-200; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83 at 1, 4. 
100. President Wilson was a great advocate for self-determination rights in the 
wake of World War I. Wilson's suggestions for stronger language concerning the right 
to self-determination did not, however, appear in the Covenant. In any event, the United 
States did not join the League, limiting his impact even further. CLARENCE A. BER-
DAHL, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
7-13, 38 (1932). Despite these hurdles, President Wilson's thoughts clearly still had an 
impact on then-existing political thought, with his conception of self-determination 
rights being argued by the Aalanders and seemingly accepted as possessing some level 
of authority by the Commission in its decision presented to the League. See Aaland 
Islands Report, supra note 83 at 1. 
101. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 199-200. 
102. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1. 
103. Id. 
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dependent interests for annexing the Aaland Islands.' °4 The first was to sup-
port the self-determination of the Aalanders, a people the Swedish had deep 
cultural ties to.'0 5 The Commission seemed to accept this rationale for 
Swedish involvement, finding that Sweden "ha[d] no selfish rights" nor any 
"annexationist views," but was only motivated by a "profound interest 
aroused by men of her own race and by the fear that their fate may be a 
°6 
precarious and unhappy one if they remain tied to another nationality."'
' 
The second reason was far more strategic; the Swedes wanted to en-
sure the neutrality of the Aaland Islands, something particularly important 
to Swedish defense interests given the location of the islands. 10 7 It is likely 
that for this reason Sweden never produced an argument in the alternative 
to the reunification of Sweden and the Aaland Islands. In a move that likely 
severely-and perhaps fatally-undermined the argument that Sweden was 
concerned for the rights of their cultural brothers, Sweden elected not to 
argue that the Aaland Islands could be independent to affect their self-deter-
mination rights, even if not unified with Sweden. 0 8 Put most simply, Swe-
den argued all-or-nothing; the Aaland Islands should reunify with Sweden 
0 9 to achieve their rights. 1 
Finland's assertions focused on preserving the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Finnish state." 0 In this way, Finland first asserted any 
debate over the status of the Aaland Islands was a political question; one 
which ought to be handled domestically and internally."' Finland's asser-
tion of its territorial integrity was so strong that it arrested two Aalander 
leaders, Carl Bjorkman and Julius Sundblom for treason. 1 2 The men were 
later convicted, but-perhaps as a result of the growing international con-
troversy-given lighter sentences that they never actually were made to 
serve.' Finland's alternative argument was that the Aalanders had ample 
access to self-determination rights and that the Finnish government had 
taken numerous steps, both constitutional and legislative, to ensure that the 
Aalanders had ample rights.' 14This argument may be responsible, at least in 
part, for the effective nullification of Bjorkman and Sundblom's convic-
104. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 200. 
105. Id. 
106. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1. 
107. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 200. 
108. Id. 
109. See id. 
110. Id.; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1. 
Ill. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 201. 
112. Id. at 200. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 201. 
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tions. The position of arguing that a minority population has ample rights 
within a democracy while that same democracy almost simultaneously con-
victed two of the group's leaders for publically dissenting against the gov-
ernment is-at best-unenviable. 
115 
Viewing the competing arguments together, it is apparent that the 
struggle between a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity and a peo-
ple's right to self-determination has already emerged in international law. 
To reconcile the two, the Commission attempted to find a compromise be-
tween the interests of both parties by employing a mixed strategy of what 
has been termed "the carrot and the stick. ' 116 The carrot served to incen-
tivize and compensate compliance in the interest of finding a mutually ben-
eficial solution. 1 7 The stick, unsurprisingly, served to coerce compliance 
18 through less agreeable means. 
The final determination of the Commission was that the Aaland Is-
lands were not able to secede from Finland under then-existing international 
law." 9 The Commission felt that "[t]he idea of justice and of liberty, em-
bodied in the formula of self-determination, must be applied in a reasonable 
manner to the relations between States and the minorities they include."' 20 
Further, the rights of minorities must be respected as much as possible in a 
civilized country, including self-determination and cultural rights.' 2' In a 
sense, the Commission is discussing the aforementioned conflict between 
self-determination and territorial integrity. 22 To reconcile the competing in-
terests, the Commission asks a rhetorical question: "what reasons would 
there be for allowing a minority to separate itself from the State to which it 
is united, if this State gives it the guarantees which it is within its rights in 
demanding, for the preservation of its social, ethical or religious charac-
ter?"'123 The Commission answers its own question by stating definitively 
115. It should, however, be noted that the League of Nations Commission was 
unimpressed by the Aalander's argument that the arrests of Bjorkman and Sundblom 
constitute any sort of persecution of the Aalander people. The Commission was per-
suaded by Finland's argument that the men were in direct violation of aspects of Fin-
land's penal code. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4. 
116. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 202. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 5. 
120. Id. at 4. 
121. Id. 
122. See id. 
123. Id. 
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that, "[s]uch indulgence... would be supremely unjust o the State prepared 
to make these concessions."
12 4 
For the Aalanders, this rule meant continued alignment with Fin-
land. 25 In support of this section of its decision the Commission noted that 
"[t]he new Finnish Constitution seems... to establish clearly enough equal-
ity between the two languages."' 2 6 In short, because the Finnish government 
was willing to make certain concessions to allow the Aalanders the ability 
to practice their culture, specifically continue to speak Swedish, they were 
unable to secede. 27 The Commission did not shy away from recognizing 
that its decision may well have been different under a different factual situ-
ation. 2 8 "If it were true that incorporation with Sweden [and with it, inher-
ently, secession from Finland] was the only means of preserving its 
Swedish language for Aaland, we should not have hesitated to consider this 
solution." 2 9 In this way, the Commission reconciled the competing interests 
of self-determination and territorial integrity. The Commission effectively 
established a rule where a state is due its territorial integrity and, with it, the 
ability to prevent secessions, where the state is providing for the rights of its 
people.130 This is particularly relevant for minority populations within a 
state, who likely lack the same levels of access to political mechanisms as 
most in the same state. However, the Commission also left a door open for 
secession in the event that states do not take steps, as the Commission 
found Finland had, to preserve the rights of its minority populations.' 31 In 
this case, a people may then have a right to secede in order to protect their 
access to rights. 
32 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 5. 
126. Id. at 6. It is worth noting that the Commission's assertion with respect to this 
point seems vague and well-qualified. Upon one reading, that the constitution being 
discussed "establishes[-] clearly enough[-]equality (punctuation added for clarity)," 
the impression is given that the equality between the languages may be ambiguous; 
certainly something which would be unacceptable to the Aalanders. The other possible 
reading, that the Finnish constitution "establishes clearly[,] enough equality (punctua-
tion added for clarity)," would also be unpalatable to the Aalanders who would cer-
tainly prefer to have equality of languages, rather than "enough" equality of languages. 
Additionally, this reading of the decision would seem to border on oxymoronic. How 
can a language have "enough" equality? Equality would seem to be binary-either it 
exists or it does not. Id. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. at 5. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 4. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
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While the Aalanders' plea for secession may have been denied, the 
Commission clear!y rejected the notion that secession itself is completely 
impermissible.' 33 The larger rule to be gleaned from the decision is, in fact, 
quite the opposite. Secession, according the Commission, can be legally 
permitted. 134 In the Commission's own words: "[t]he separation of a minor-
ity... can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last 
resort when the State lacks either the will of the power to enact and apply 
just and effective guarantees [of access to rights]."' 13 5 The Commission thus 
explains that, in a situation where a state is failing to provide for the rights 
of a people within its borders, those people may be able to express a right to 
secession as a way to achieve their rights. 136 This can be done when a state 
is unwilling to provide the rights to its people, such as a totalitarian state or 
in the presence of a government-sanctioned policy of oppression. 137 It can 
also be attained when a government, through either impotence, apathy, or a 
combination of both, is incapable of protecting and providing rights to its 
people. 138 The Commission tempers this right though, declaring that it is to 
be used as a last resort; that is to say, all other reasonable options must have 
failed a people before they may be able to secede legally. 139 
B. UN Era 
The conclusion of World War II announced a radical shift in the or-
ganization of the world. The emerging superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, would clash, establishing a bipolar globe. Caught some-
where between the two was the vast majority of remaining states. To ensure 
this powder keg was never sparked, the global community endeavored to 
create a new international governing body. Considering the failures of the 
League of Nations to prevent war, the new body would need more power to 
effectively mediate conflicts. The situation was thought to be particularly 





136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. By 1949, the Soviet Union had joined the United States as a nuclear power, 
plunging the world into the deepest part of the Cold War. The nuclear arms race only 
grew for the next several decades rendering mutually assured destruction not just a 
possibility but the policy of both superpowers. For more discussion of mutually assured 
destruction and the Cold War nuclear arms race see, e.g., GETTING MAD: NUCLEAR 
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS ORIGINS AND PRACTICE (Henry D. Sokolski, ed., 
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The UN was created out of the ashes of World War II, and with the 
memory of the Holocaust still freshly burned into the international psyche. 
The world had seen the results of the dual failures of the League of Nations. 
First, it had failed its main objective: it had not prevented the next "great 
war." Even worse, it had failed to prevent the human rights atrocities that 
came along with the Second World War. The Holocaust, the Rape of Nank-
ing, and countless other tragedies had transpired on the watch of the League 
of Nations. The new international organization, the UN, would be more 
well-equipped to mediate and prevent conflict. Not only that, but it would 
also serve to protect, preserve, and grow human rights, an emerging facet in 
international law. Necessitated by the scars of the inhumane acts that oc-
curred during the war, human rights would become a core value to the UN. 
A value that, unlike in the Covenant of the League of Nations, would be 
enshrined in the founding documents of the new United Nations. 
1. UN Documents/Conventions/Covenants/International Agreements 
The UN Charter was a vast step forward for human rights, particularly 
the right to self-determination.' 4' Where the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions focuses squarely on the state as the sole actor in the international 
world, 42 the UN Charter also makes room to discuss human beings as indi-
viduals. 43 The Charter asserts that, while the state remains the main actor in 
the international community, individual people also have rights.' 44 Key 
among these rights for the purposes of secession are the rights to self-deter-
mination and the rights of non-self-governing territories. 
The self-determination rights of all people are enshrined in article one 
of the UN Charter. 45 Paragraph two of that article provides that one of the 
purposes of the UN is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
2004). Perhaps the most vivid and famous expression of this thought comes from Man-
hattan Project veteran Albert Einstein who is said to have opined: "I do not know how 
the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will use in the 
Fourth-Rocks!" ALICE CALAPRICE, THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 173 (2005). 
141. CompareCharter of the League of Nations, with U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
142. See supra text accompanying footnotes 71-80. 
143. See U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (discussing rights of people). 
144. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (providing self-determination rights to 
all people); U.N. Charter art. I, para. 3 (ensuring all people are due human rights, 
irrespective of race, sex, and religion); U.N. Charter art. 73 (indicating the rights due to 
individuals living in non-self-governing territories). 
145. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
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peace." 146 Article seventy-three of the UN Charter echoes similar sentiment 
with respect to non-self-governing territories. 147 This article restrains UN 
member states to ensure that the cultures of non-self-governing peoples are 
respected and cultivated. 148 Even more impressive, the article places the 
burden on member states to aid in the "develop[ment of] self-government 
[within non-self-governing territories], to take due account of the political 
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop-
ment of their free political institutions."' 49 
Years after the creation of the UN and its Charter took force, another 
international treaty, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD") was created. 50 This treaty, 
which entered into force in 1969, furthered the racial protections afforded 
under international law. 151 Just one year later, the ICJ determined that sev-
eral provisions of the ICERD represented erga omnes norms of interna-
tional law. 52 Article fifteen, paragraph two reaffirms the rights of those 
peoples living in non-self-governing territories. 153 These rights are 
important 
[p]ending the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples... the 
provisions of this Convention shall in no way limit the right of peti-
tion granted to these peoples by other international instruments or by 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 1
54 
In this way, the Convention is again reinforcing self-determination-it is 
preserving the rights of non-self-governing people until such a time when 
they are able to achieve a full measure of self-determination. '55 
Additionally, the Covenant specifically enumerates many rights which 
people have irrespective of race. 156 By providing more rights due to all peo-
146. Id. 
147. See U.N. Charter art. 73. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965) [herein-
after ICERD]. 
151. See id. 
152. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 645 (citing Case Concerning Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, para. 24 (Feb. 5) (find-
ing the protection from racial discrimination to be an obligation erga omnes). 
153. ICERD, supra note 150, art. 15, para. 2. 
154. See id. para. 1. 
155. See id. art. 15. 
156. Id. art. 5. 
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pie, the Covenant also presents more ways people may be subject to rights 
violations. 57 Most simply, by having more rights, people may now be sub-
ject to more rights violations. 58 As a result of this, it is easier for certain 
peoples to make the argument that they are being subjected to rights viola-
tions.' 59 Accordingly, their right to self-determination may more readily 
give way to a right to external self-determination and secession so as to 
preserve a people's other rights, such as those guaranteed by the ICERD. 
60 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
("ICESCR")' 61 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR") 62 are also instructive as to the extent of the right to self-deter-
mination. Both Covenants share a common first article. 163 The first para-
graph of this article states unequivocally "[a]il peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their politi-
cal states and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment." 64 The ICESCR and ICCPR, with 160 and 167 parties, respectively, 
as of 2012, are considered to be binding law on those states party to the 
Conventions. 65 With such a significant acceptance by states, scholars have 
asserted that the ICESCR and ICCPR may constitute customary interna-
tional law, 166 making their provisions binding on all states, not just those 
party to the agreements. 
67 
1970 would see one of the strongest conceptions of the right to self-
determination to date with the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion 25/2625.168 This resolution, titled the Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among 
157. Id. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. Id.; Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4. 
161. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
162. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
163. ICESCR, supra note 161, art. 1;ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 1. 
164. Id. 
165. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 638. 
166. See generally, Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in InternationalLaw: Compliance 
with Aspects of the "InternationalBill of Rights," 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 437 
(2009) (discussing the potential for the ICCPR and ICESCR to be considered customary 
international law). 
167. BROWNLIE'S, supranote 26, at 23-30 (discussing customary international law 
generally). 
168. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the 
7
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States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 169 has become 
known commonly as the Friendly Relations Declaration. Recognized by the 
ICJ as customary international law, 170 the Friendly Relations Declaration is 
binding on all states. 171This is of great impact because the Declaration con-
tains some of the most forceful language on self-determination to be found 
in international law. 172 According to the Declaration "[e]very State has the 
duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples... of their 
'right to self-determination and freedom and independence."173 The Friendly 
Relations Declaration continues to place a duty on states to recognize that 
self-determination rights allow all peoples to determine their political status 
and that states not only may not hinder this exercise of rights, but must 
actively promote the use of this right. 174 
Despite the utility of these statements for those seeking to exercise 
self-determination, the Friendly Relations Declaration is most unique for 
one specific proposition. The Declaration states that: 
[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free as-
sociation or integration with an independent State or the emergence 
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute 
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that 
75
people. 1 
This seemingly innocuous language represents a titanic shift in the under-
standing of self-determination by the international community. The Decla-
ration is recognizing that the right to self-determination can be invoked to 
establish a sovereign and independent state. 176 The functional effect of this 
is to recognize that the creation of a new state-secession--is indeed an 
expression of self-determination rights.1 7 
The Friendly Relations Declaration, perhaps in an effort to compro-
mise with the firm statement that secession can be an expression of self-
Charter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter 
Friendly Relations Declaration]. 
169. Id. 
170. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 188, 191, 264 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] 
(finding the Friendly Relations Declaration to be customary international law). 
171. See BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 23-30 (indicating the consequences of 
customary international law). 
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determination rights, also contains a clause reinforcing territorial 
integrity: 178 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally 
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as de-
scribed above and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour. 
179 
While at first glance, this seems to bode ill for a people's ability to secede, 
such a harsh interpretation is unfounded. 
This language, instead, reconciles the decades-old conflict between 
territorial integrity and external self-determination rights. 180 The underlying 
rule is that a state's territorial integrity is to be respected as indivisible con-
tingent upon the state respecting the rights and self-determination of all 
peoples within its borders.' 8' In this way, a state failing to effectuate its 
people's rights or self-determination has violated its obligation to the inter-
national community.' 82 As a consequence of this, said state is not entitled to 
have its territorial integrity respected and the people or peoples whose 
rights are being violated have the right to express their external self-deter-
mination and secede to access their rights. 
83 
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is also instructive on the growth of the 
right to self-determination in international law. 184 The Act was signed by 
thirty-five states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, along 
with their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. 85 Overtime, the Act has become 
more broadly applicable. 86 This Act, held to be indicative of customary 
international law by the ICJ in its Nicaragua decision, 87 also affirms that 
self-determination rights can be utilized by a people outside of their state.' 88 
The most telling statement of the Act indicates that the right to self-determi-
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki 
1975 (Aug. 1, 1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. 
185. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 637. 
186. See id. 
187. Nicaragua, supra note 170, paras. 189, 204, 269. 
188. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 184, art. VIII. 
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nation grants a people the right "to determine, when and as they wish, their 
internal and external political status."'189 In this way, the Act recognizes and 
confirms that the right to self-determination includes the ability of a people 
to determine their external political status.190 
2. Judicial Determinations 
Despite the utility of the international agreements discussed above in 
determining the status of self-determination and secession in international 
law, they represent only a portion of the law available. Judicial decisions 
and opinions are also highly instructive in determining the status of the 
issue in international law. 
The ICJ first grappled with the issue of self-determination in its advi-
sory opinion concerning the situation in Namibia. 191 The situation in 
Namibia arose from the continued occupation of South Africa within the 
territory of Namibia. 192 Decades before the issue before the Court existed, 
South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer the 
territory of Namibia, then known as German South West Africa. 93 Follow-
ing the replacement of the League Nations by the UN, this mandate was 
replaced by a trusteeship. 94 After implementation of a policy of apartheid 
in Namibia, South Africa was stripped of its trusteeship over the territory.195 
South Africa remained in control of Namibia after this relationship ended, 
prompting a Security Council resolution condemning the continued occupa-
tion. 196 In defiance of this resolution, South Africa continued to occupy 
Namibia, prompting a request for an advisory opinion on the legal ramifica-
tions of South Africa's actions. 
97 
Self-determination rights of people were crucial to the Court's deter-
mination. The Court noted that the UN Charter made self-determination 
rights accessible to all people residing in non-self-governing territories. 98 
The Court then held that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia was 
illegal because it violated the self-determination rights of the Namibian 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]. 
192. Namibia, supra note 191, para. 1. 
193. Id. para. 49. 
194. Id. para. 76. 
195. Id. paras. 128-31. 
196. S.C. Res. 276 (Jan. 30, 1970) 
197. Namibia, supra note 191, para. 42. 
198. Id. para. 52. 
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people. 199 In holding as such, the Court accepted the notion that self-deter-
mination rights are legally enforceable. 200 Namibia thus stands for the pro-
position that a violation of self-determination rights may give those 
suffering from the violation legal recourse. 
Four years later the ICJ again addressed self-determination, this time 
in its Western Sahara advisory opinion. 20 1 Western Saharaarose out of a 
dispute between Morocco and Mauritania concerning a disputed territory, 
Western Sahara.202 The region, initially colonized by Spain, was going 
through the process of decolonization when both Morocco and Mauritania 
laid claims to the territory. 203 In an effort to resolve the conflict, the Gener-
ally Assembly called upon the ICJ to answer two questions in an advisory 
decision. First, at the time of colonization by Spain was Western Sahara 
terra nuilius?2°4 And, second, if not, what were the legal ties to Morocco 
and Mauritania?205 In evaluating these questions, the Court found the law of 
0 6
self-determination to be useful. 
2 
As it applies to the topic of secession, Western Sahara dealt exten-
0 7 
sively with the application of the self-determination right of a people. 
2 
The Court specifically discussed the conception of the right put forth by the 
General Assembly in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples.208 In this declaration, the right to self-de-
termination is discussed as a right of the peoples. 2°9 Accordingly, self-deter-
mination is not a right for a state to exercise on behalf of its people, but 
rather, is a right granted innately to a people.210 Self-determination need not 
be a right grated by a state for its people to effect it.211 Indeed, because it is 
a right to people, it may well be used against a state should a conflict arise 
between the two parties.21 2 The Court concluded by noting that Western 
Sahara was not terra nullius and it had legal ties to both Mauritania and 
199. Id. paras. 52, 53, 133. 
200. See id. paras. 52, 53. 
201. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Reports 12 (Oct. 16) [herein-
after Western Sahara]. 
202. Id. para. I. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. Terra nullius refers to the notion of land belonging to no one. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. paras. 54-59, 71, 162. 
207. Id. paras. 54-55. 
208. Id. para. 55. 
209. Id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. 
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Morocco, though neither state had sufficient ties to claim sovereignty over 
Western Sahara.2 13 Failing to find either of these ties to constitute sover-
eignty, the Court held that the self-determination of the people ought to be 
the determining factor in its political alignment.
21 4 
The debate over secession and self-determination has not been limited 
to international courts. Domestic jurisdictions have also struggled with ap-
plying the murky standards that have evolved over time. One of the most 
cited cases on secession comes from a domestic court, the Canadian Su-
preme Court, Canada's highest judicial body.215 Following growing seces-
sionist sentiment in Quebec, the Canadian Governor in Council submitted a 
request for an advisory opinion to the Canadian Supreme Court. 216 
The court was faced with three questions to fully determine the issue at 
hand.21 7 The first was: "Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National 
Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec effect the secession of Que-
bec from Canada unilaterally?" 2 8 Effectively, question one is relatively 
simple; the Governor in Council is asking whether Canadian domestic law 
has some mechanism by which Quebec, or a governmental body represent-
ing Quebec, may effect a unilateral secession. 2 19 Being a determination on 
domestic law, the court's determination that Canadian law does not allow 
for unilateral secession is of limited value to this analysis. 
220 
The second question is significantly more complex and is composed of 
two parts. 22 1 It reads: 
Does international law give the National Assembly legislature or 
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-deter-
mination under international law that would give the National As-
sembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 222 
213. Id. para. 162. 
214. See id. 
215. This may perhaps be because it is easily the most accessible domestic case 
directly on the subject. The United States Supreme Court itself wrestled with the issue 
in 1869 when a state (somewhat predictably, Texas) asserted a right to secede. The 
court roundly rejected Texas's argument that it was entitled to secession. Texas v. 
White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868). 




220. See id. para. 107. 
221. See id. para. 2. 
222. Id. 
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As asserted above, the second question put to the court has, in fact, 
two parts of arguable distinction. 223 The first part asks the court generally 
whether any standard or rule of extant international law could give Quebec 
the right to unilaterally secede. 224 The second part does not truly ask a dis-
tinct question but, instead, refines and clarifies the first.225 It directs the 
court to specifically consider whether a right to self-determination under 
international law exists and, if so, if that right could give rise to a means for 
Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada. 
226 
To answer this question, the court surveys numerous sources of inter-
national law and comes to the conclusion that secession is permitted under 
international law in three cases. 227 One of the first points addressed by the 
court was the argument that, in international law generally, there is a pre-
sumption that anything not explicitly prohibited is permitted.228 This asser-
tion likely stems from the Permanent Court of International Justice's 
229 
230decision in its S.S. Lotus case. The S.S. Lotus case is known for establish-
ing what is now known as the Lotus Principle.23 ' Simply put, the principle 
supports the notion that an action not specifically prohibited by interna-
tional law may be assumed to be permitted. 232 The court largely declines to 
address the Lotus Principle, noting only that in the case of unilateral seces-
sion, the denial necessary under the Lotus Principle may be implicit be-
223. See id. para. 2. The distinction between the two sections is dubious because, 
as will be discussed supra in section V of this article, the effects of the self-determina-
tion referenced by the second part of the second question is the most likely and realistic 
source of the right to unilateral secession asked about in the first part of that question. 
Accordingly, the second half of the question functions more as a clarification and direc-
tive to the court. It serves to instruct the court to specifically consider and evaluate the 
merits of an argument asserting the legality of unilateral secession stemming from the 
right to self-determination. In doing so, it cannot be said to be asking the court an 
altogether different question. 
224. Id. 
225. See id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. paras. 132-34. 
228. Id. para. I 1l. 
229. The ironically named Permanent Court of International Justice was the prede-
cessor court to the ICJ. As such, it served the League of Nations in much the same way 
that the ICJ serves the UN. 
230. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
231. See id. paras. 46, 53, 60, 65, 73 (establishing the principle that, in interna-
tional law, an action not specifically prohibited may be assumed to be permitted). 
232. See id. 
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cause of the "exceptional circumstances required for secession to be 
permitted under the right of a people to self-determination." 
233 
The court uses this to segue into a discussion on the right to self-deter-
mination and the extent of such a right.234 The court starts by noting that, 
while international law predominantly views the state as the primary actor, 
certain rights of non-state actors are recognized. 235 Among these rights is 
the right of people to self-determination. 236 The court then runs through 
several international conventions and resolutions affirming the right of peo-
ple to self-determination, some of which were discussed supra.237 It is noted 
specifically that "the sheer number of resolutions concerning the right of 
self-determination make their enumeration impossible. 238 
Having established that a right to self-determination does exist under 
extant international law, the Canadian Supreme Court turned to addressing 
the scope of that right.239 Self-determination is generally meant to be exer-
cised internally.2 40 That is to say, "a people's pursuit of its political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing 
state. '24' However, in some rare cases, self-determination may be exercised 
externally.242 A people may establish a sovereign and independent nation if 
the same people is incapable of effecting its self-determination rights 
internally.24
3 
These rare cases fall into three general categories. 244 First, the right of 
colonized peoples to use their right to self-determination to separate from a 
colonial power.245 The court found that this particular case was so well doc-
umented within international law that it is an "undisputed" right of colo-
nized people.246 Second, the court finds it a "clear case" that a people have a 
right to secession through external self-determination where it is "subject to 
alien subjugation, domination or exploitation. 2 47 This right may occur 
233. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 112. 
234. See id. paras. 113-22, 126-30. 
235. Id. para. 113. 
236. Id. 
237. See id. paras. 114-22. 
238. Id. para. 117. 
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245. Id. para. 132. 
246. Id. 
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outside of the colonial context. 248 This second means to secession-where a
people may secede when faced with subjugation and exploitation-is refer-
ring to remedial secession. 249 The court also notes the potential for a third 
means: secession being permissible where a people have no meaningful 
way to exercise self-determination internally, they may, as a last resort, be 
entitled to secede in order to gain the ability to access their right. 250 These 
three situations are later synthesized, with the court stating "[i]n all three 
situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-
determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally 
their right to self-determination. ' 25' This understanding of the rule is ex-
tremely similar to the League of Nations Commission of Rapporteur's de-
termination with respect to the Aaland Islands, where it was determined that 
a minority population may only secede when they are part of a state which 
is unwilling or unable to guarantee them to their rights.
25 2 access 
Applying the facts present to the framework established, the court de-
termined that Quebec lacked the legal ability to secede under international 
law, just as it did under Canadian domestic law.253 Quebec was not cur-
rently existing in a colonial context, rendering the first means of secession 
inoperable according to the court. 254 Similarly, the people of Quebec cannot 
be said to be an oppressed people, preventing them from accessing remedial 
secession. 255 With respect o the final means of permissible secession, "[t]he 
population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to gov-
ernment. 2 56 Having failed to meet the criteria for any of the three excep-
tional circumstance which would have allowed secession, Quebec was 
denied the ability to secede. 
257 
The final question posed to the Canadian Supreme Court asks, "[i]n 
the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right 
of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take prece-
dence in Canada?"258 The Governor in Council appeared concerned with the 
potential for conflict between domestic and international law and sought 
248. Id. 
249. See id. 
250. Id. para. 134. 
251. Id. para. 138. 
252. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4. 
253. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 138. 
254. Id. para. 154. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. para. 136. 
257. Id. para. 138. 
258. Id. para. 2. 
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clarification as to which would apply should the two be found to be incon-
gruent. 259 In any event, the court determined that there was no conflict be-
tween domestic and international law, because both indicated that Quebec 
°lacked the legal right to secede under either legal system. 26 Accordingly, 
the court determined that there was no need to address the third question 
further.2
6' 
The closest the ICJ has yet to come to ruling directly on the issue of 
secession was in its advisory opinion on the situation in Kosovo. 262 In Ko-
sovo, the court was asked to determine the legality of a unilateral declara-
tion of independence. 263 The court relied heavily on the self-determination 
principle to come to the conclusion that the people of Kosovo had the legal 
right to unilaterally declare their independence from Serbia.264 This decision 
paved the way for states to recognize an independent Kosovo and, in effect, 
allow for Kosovo's secession.2
65 
The Kosovo case arises from what the UN Security Council termed the 
"grave humanitarian situation" in Kosovo.266 The Security Council specifi-
cally admonished the "violence and repression in Kosovo.' ' 267 In response to 
this, a UN coalition was sent into the region to prevent further violence. 268 
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo adopted a declaration of independence in an 
259. Id. 
260. Id. para. 147. 
261. Id. 
262. Worthy of note during a discussion of the ICJ's advisory opinion in Kosovo 
is the fact that the ICJ allowed the people that would come to be the people of Kosovo, 
then a sub-state group, to submit documents to the Court. This in and of itself certainly 
evidences a changing attitude towards the treatment of sub-state entities under interna-
tional law generally, and before the ICJ specifically. Indeed, there is significant evi-
dence of the Court allowing such groups-groups one scholar has termed "aspiring 
states"-to have a voice before it. For further discussion on Kosovo's status before the 
ICJ in the Kosovo advisory opinion and the status of aspiring states generally, see Shana 
Tabak, Aspiring States, 64 BuFF. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2016). 
263. See Kosovo, supra note 57, paras. 1, 51. 
264. See id. para. 123. 
265. To date over 100 states have recognized Kosovo as an independent state. The 
European Union is currently facilitating discussions between Serbia and Kosovo to take 
steps towards Serbia's recognition of Kosovo's independence. Kosovo has also begun 
to take steps towards European Union Membership. U.S. RELATIONS WITH Kosovo, 
U.S. DEPT.OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm (Mar. 17, 2016). 
266. Kosovo, supra note 57, para. 58. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
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effort to politically distance itself from Serbia and, presumably, the vio-
with it.269lence that came 
The Kosovo Court begins its analysis by noting that self-determination 
rights have developed to give a right of independence to peoples subjected 
to subjugation, domination, or exploitation, in effect large-scale human 
rights violations. 270 While the determination of the lawfulness of the decla-
ration of independence was based largely on grounds that a declaration of 
independence does not, in and of itself, violate a state's territorial integrity, 
the Court notes that many states present in the proceedings discussed the 
issue before the Court in the context of remedial secession. 27' The Court, 
however, found it unnecessary to provide a determination on either the le-
gality of remedial secession or its application to the situation in Kosovo. 
272 
In making this determination, it is noted that "[t]he General Assembly has 
requested the Court's opinion only on whether or not the declaration of 
independence is in accordance with international law. 
2 73 
Kosovo provides favorable law relative to remedial secession in two 
ways. The first is the re-affirming of the ability of a people to seek its 
independence when subjected to subjugation, domination, or exploitation. 
In this way, it is arguable that the Court is addressing, and more impor-
tantly, accepting, remedial secession by another name. 274 The second im-
portant note is that the Court elected to not rule on the idea of remedial 
secession.2 75 While it is certainly true that the Court could have taken this 
opportunity to affirm the right of remedial secession in some, limited cir-
cumstances, it is more important-given the trend towards expanding self-
determination rights-that it did not reject the right out of hand. 
What the Court refused to do in its advisory opinion, recognize the 
legitimacy of remedial secession, Judges Antonio Augusto Canqado 
Trindade and Abdulqawi Yusuf seem to have done so in their individual 
separate opinions. Judge Canqado Trindade asserted that the traditional in-
269. See id. para. 57. 
270. See id. para. 79. 
271. Id. paras. 80-82. 
272. Id. para. 83. 
273. Id. 
274. Remedial secession is done to cure human rights violations. Thus, for the 
Court to state that a people may exercise its right to self-determination to gain indepen-
dence (secession) when subjected to subjugation, domination, or exploitation (assuredly 
something that would constitute human rights violations under the ICCPR, ICESCR, 
and many other sources of law), is for the Court to approve of remedial secession with-
out saying it explicitly. Presumably, this is to avoid the connotation associate with the 
word "secession." 
275. Id. 
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ter-State interpretation (where a state is the smallest recognized actor in the 
international system and sub-state entities are not recognized in the interna-
276 Intional community) of international law is actively being overcome. 
support of this notion, Judge Cangado Trindade makes clear that presently 
non-self-governing territories have a unique status vis-ii-vis the State ad-
ministering them.277 This different status exists to protect the right to self-
determination of the peoples within the non-self-governing territory.278 
Thus, the "purely inter-State paradigm of classic international law" has 
been, and continues to be, eroded by present developments. 279 Indeed, "[i]n 
the current evolution of international law, international practice. . . provides 
support for the exercise of self-determination by peoples under permanent 
adversity or systemic repression, beyond the traditional confines of the his-
torical process of decolonization. '280 Judge Canqado Trindade is accord-
ingly noting that, irrespective of the traditional understanding of 
international law and its bounds, current practice is supportive to the idea of 
remedial secession in the event of "permanent adversity or systemic repres-
sion. ' 28 1 This is a direct result of the fact that "[c]ontemporary international 
law is no longer insensitive to patterns of systemic oppression and 
subjugation. 28
s2 
Judge Yusuf offered an even more direct and powerful sentiment, writ-
ing separately to note that while "[s]urely, there is not general positive right 
under international law which entitles all ethnically or racially distinct 
groups within existing States to claim separate statehood... [t]his does not, 
however, mean that international law turns a blind eye to the plight of such 
groups. '283 Instead, "the right of peoples to self-determination may support 
a claim to separate statehood. '284 This may only occur though where a state 
not only prevents these peoples from exercising their right to self-determi-
nation, but "also subject them to discrimination, persecution and egregious 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law. ' 285 Judge Yusuf thus con-
cludes that under existing international law: 
if a State fails to comport itself in accordance with the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, an exceptional situa-
276. Id. para. 183 (separate opinion by Cangado Trindade, J.). 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. para. 184. 
280. Id. 
281. See id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. paras. 10-11 (separate opinion by Yusuf, J.). 
284. Id. para. 11. 
285. Id. 
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tion may arise whereby the ethnically or racially distinct group de-
nied internal self-determination may claim a right of external self-
determination or separation from the State which could effectively 
put into question the State's territorial unity and sovereignty. 
286 
Taking all of the present legal authority together and-more impor-
tantly-viewing the historical trend, one can see the evolution of the right 
to self-determination. The right has grown in both force and scope from the 
time of Grotius to the modern era. What was, even at the time of the UN's 
formation, an almost academic ideal for the international community to 
reach towards has evolved into a legally enforceable right of all people. 
This right now includes the ability to, in limited circumstances, express 
itself externally. Such external self-determination may even take the form 
of secession when the state to which the people expressing the right are a 
part of fails to uphold its obligations to provide all of its citizens their 
human rights, including an effective measure of internal self-determination. 
As the right has progressed, a clear trend favoring the rights of people rather 
than those of the state emerges. The next logical step in this progression is a 
clear, enforceable rule by which a people may enforce their self-determina-
tion against a state and secede. 
IV. REMEDIAL SECESSION AS A PerSe Right 
One of the most controversial pieces of the secession debate is the 
fervent dispute over remedial secession not as an expression of self-deter-
mination, but, rather, as a per se stand-alone right. While remedial seces-
sion is often discussed independently of self-determination rights,2 87 the two 
are inseparable. As discussed at length in section IV of this comment, the 
Quebec decision outlines three legal mechanisms for secession.2 88 The sec-
ond mechanism being when a people are subjected to alienation, domina-
tion, or exploitation;2 89 and the third being when a people are unable to 
effectuate self-determination within their state.
2 90 
This section of this comment seeks to establish that these two means of 
achieving legal secession are defacto the same and, accordingly, should not 
be treated differently. This is because, under relevant international law, a 
people subjected to the alienation, domination, or exploitation referenced by 
286. Id. para. 12. 
287. See Quebec, supra note 54, paras. 133-34 (separating secession for purposes 
of correcting the exploitation and domination of people from secession done as an ex-
pression of external self-determination when internal self-determination is unavailable). 
288. Id. paras. 132-34. 
289. Id. para. 133. 
290. Id. para. 134. 
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the court in Quebec would, in theory, lack any effective means of self-
determination. 291 Similarly, a people lacking any means for sufficient self-
determination within their state would likely-if not inherently and by defi-
nition-be facing human rights violations which can be said to rise to the 
level of alienation, domination, or exploitation.
292 
To expand on this issue, a hypothetical is useful. If a people within a 
country lack acceptable access to self-determination they are inherently suf-
fering alienation, domination, or exploitation. We know this for several rea-
sons. The first is that self-determination in and of itself is a human right. 
Absent access to this right, a people are inherently suffering from the domi-
nation necessary to effect secession. Additionally, if a people were com-
pletely denied access to their self-determination rights there would have to 
be some mechanism by which their state would put them into such a situa-
tion. This mechanism would presumably require the violation of other 
human rights, specifically those enshrined in the ICCPR, among other inter-
national agreements. 293 To prevent a specific group or people from exercis-
ing their self-determination rights, a state would inherently have to enact a 
policy which treated that group or people distinctly from the remainder of 
their compatriots. In doing so, an ICCPR violation would occur. 294 
Just as a lack of self-determination rights is indicative of a policy of 
alienation, domination, or exploitation, evidence of such egregious human 
rights violations which rise to the level of alienation, domination, or ex-
ploitation will, inherently, mean that the people subject to such a policy 
have no meaningful access to self-determination. For evidence of this, one 
need look no further than the definition of self-determination. Numerous 
previously discussed international agreements conclude that self-determina-
tion entails control over ones political situation.295 If a people finds itself in 
a situation where it is subject to human rights violations it can be inferred 
that the people in question has little to no effective control over its political 
situation. No people would voluntarily create, or allow to be created, a po-
litical system that would subject them to human rights violations. In this 
way, we can know that a people suffering human rights violations on the 
291. See supra text accompanying footnotes 281-282 (arguing that a people with 
effective internal self-determination would be incapable of preventing their own aliena-
tion, domination, and exploitation). 
292. See supra text accompanying footnote 283. 
293. ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 2. 
294. Id. (providing that a state must treat its citizens "without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status."). 
295. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 161, art. 1; 
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 168. 
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scale of alienation, domination, or exploitation lacks control over its politi-
cal situation. Accordingly, it can be inferred that such a people is also lack-
ing self-determination rights. 
Thus, the two types of secession discussed by the court in Quebec, 
secession to cure a people's alienation, domination, or exploitation and se-
cession to achieve a degree of self-determination, are identical in practice. 
As such, future scholarship and debate concerning the legality of secession 
would be best served to treat the two as a uniform entity-one legal right to 
remedial secession in certain, limited circumstances. This understanding 
provides a clearer, more cogent synthesis of the existing law-from all 
sources, not simply the Quebec decision-concerning secession. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been shown, a legitimate right to remedial secession-in cer-
tain, limited circumstances-can be found under currently existing interna-
tional law. When a people is subject to a circumstance where they cannot 
access the mechanisms of self-determination within their states, as is their 
right under international law, they may seek external self-determination to 
remedy this situation. Similarly, when a people is subject to subjugation 
such that they are suffering large-scale human rights violations, they can 
access a right to remedial secession to prevent further human rights abuses. 
These two aforementioned justifications for secession are, indeed, one 
in the same. As international law has developed, the reality has arisen that 
any people lacking any effective means of internal self-determination will 
be inherently suffering human rights violations, most obviously their right 
to self-determination. This is as true as is the converse; any people subject 
to domination and exploitation such that they are suffering significant 
human rights violations will not be able to achieve meaningful self-determi-
nation within their state. If they were, why would they not act through the 
political process to end their suffering? As the distinction between these 
two has become practically meaningless, there can be said to exist one right 
to secession outside of a colonial context. 
This conception of remedial secession is not, in itself, new. It is merely 
a refinement of existing international law. Remedial secession exists as a 
right to a people where that people is suffering a wide-spread policy of 
human rights violations. That policy of human rights violations may include 
a policy by which the people are unable to effect meaningful internal self-
determination. Put most simply, the human right being violated need not be 
something commonly thought of as a human rights violation; something of 
the severity of slavery or apartheid. A policy by which a people are denied 
their human right to self-determination may be sufficient to allow for a right 
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to remedial secession under presently-existing international law. Further 
scholarship is required to make a definitive determination on the potential 
applicability of this rule for remedial secession to any currently existing 
separatist movements. 
PRESCRIPTION 
Above all else, the international law concerning secession can best be 
described as nebulous. Despite this astonishing lack of clarity-even when 
considered relative to other issues in international law, a famously murky 
and, at times, quixotic, discipline-some conclusions may be drawn. 
Perhaps even more important to the future of the legality of secession 
than any judicial decision or example of state practice is the reality that the 
right to self-determination is constantly evolving. Quite simply, the march 
of progress is slow but certain. Indeed, it may seem that the next logical 
step in the ICJ's case law is to conclude that the right to self-determination 
may, in some circumstances, give rise to a right to secession. Numerous 
instances of secession or attempted secession are likely to occur in the com-
ing years and decades; and, with third-party states likely to become in-
volved the opportunity for the Court to speak on secession in the way it 
declined to do so in Kosovo may well present itself. By taking this step, the 
Court will be able to clarify the status of secession in international law for 
the benefit of all states and peoples. In doing so, the Court may also be able 
to effect a lasting change that may finally allow a clearly-articulated means 
for an oppressed people to come before the international community and 
take steps to remediate the harm being done to them. 
Since the dawn of the UN-era, international law has alternatively 
served two masters. On one hand, the law felt the legacies of the League of 
Nations and focused on the rights of the state as the sole actor in the inter-
national world. In opposition stands Enlightenment influences and a post-
World War II focus on ever-growing human rights norms and ideals. In the 
context of secession, these two histories support, respectively, the notion of 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination up to, and including, 
secession. It is time that this conflict be reconciled definitively. It is time 
that the law takes legitimate, effective steps towards preventing another 
Rwanda or Kosovo. It is time that the oft-cited and never enforced mantra 
of "never again" become actionable. The world and, indeed, international 
law is ready for it. All that remains is for the International Court of Justice 
to recognize and affirm remedial secession definitively. 
